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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN AGGREGATE 
CORPORATION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
OTTO BUEHNER & COMPANY, a _
 AT 
corporation, and PAUL BUEHNER, \ U a s e No-
Defendants and Respondents, 
vs. 
D. W. BRIMHALL, 
Additional Defendant on 
Counterclaim, and Cross-Complainant. 
Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
I. 
SINCE N E I T H E R BRIMHALL NOR RE-
SPONDENTS BUEHNER HAVE APPEALED 
OR CROSS-APPEALED FROM ANY POR-
TION OF T H E JUDGMENT AS MODIFIED, 
AND BRIMHALL HAS NOT F I L E D ANY 
* 
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B R I E F , D E F E N D A N T S - R E S P O N D E N T S 
H A V E NO STANDING TO A R G U E T H A T 
B R I M H A L L H A D A N Y G R E A T E R R I G H T 
T H A N TO B E P A I D A F I X E D F E E P E R TON 
F O R M I N I N G A N D C R U S H I N G S E R V I C E S . 
Plaintiff has appealed from only paragraphs 1 
and 6 of the judgment, which dismissed plaintiff's 
complaint with prejudice and which denied plaintiff 
interest and costs. No one has appealed from any por-
tion of paragraphs 2 to 5 of the judgment, as modi-
fied by court order October 15, 1973. As specified by 
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the judgment as amended after 
hearing on motion: 
"4. By reason of the settlement agreement 
made between plaintiff A M E R I C A N AG-
G R E G A T E CORPORATION and D. W. 
B R I M H A L L on July 9, 1970, D. W. BRIM-
H A L L became entitled to $7.25 per ton instead 
of $10.00 per ton for -mining and crushing serv-
ices on all tonnage shipped to defendant OTTO 
B U E H N E R & C O M P A N Y totaling 5,172 
tons, less a credit of $29,000.00 collected by 
D. W. B R I M H A L L on the first 4,000 tons 
shipped to defendant OTTO B U E H N E R & 
C O M P A N Y in 1969 and 1970, leaving a bal-
ance of $8,497.00 payable to D. W. BRIM-
H A L L computed at the rate of $7.25 per ton 
for the 1172 tons in excess of the first 4,000 tons, 
which amount shall be payable to him out of the 
money deposited or to be deposited in court by 
defendant OTTO B U E H N E R & COM-
P A N Y . 
"5. Under said settlement agreement, as to 
2 
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said 5,172 tons, D. W. B R I M H A L L was not 
entitled to $5,000.00 'move-in-costs' paid to him 
by OTTO B U E H N E R & COMPANY, nor 
to make any other charge against plaintiff in 
excess of said $7.25 per ton." (R. 941, Ab. 
143-144. Italics added). 
As the judgment was originally prepared by 
counsel for defendants and signed before counsel for 
plaintiff had opportunity to file exceptions or objec-
tions, $37,149.00 was payable to Brimhall for crushing 
only (an excessive amount), and Brimhall was allowed 
to "retain as his separate property the $5,000.00 
move-in-cost paid to him by OTTO B U E H N E R & 
COMPANY." (R. 854, Ab. 142). The modification 
of the portion of the judgment as to Brimhall was 
made to conform to his own admissions made on depo-
sition and at the trial that he was to be paid a fixed 
price of $10 per ton for mining and crushing services, 
and nothing in excess of that amount. 
Inasmuch as neither Brimhall nor defendants-
respondents have appealed from that portion of the 
judgment as modified, we believe they are precluded 
from collaterally assailing that portion of the judg-
ment as modified. However, on pages 12 to 22 of their 
brief defendants-respondents argue their Point I : 
"The Court did not commit prejudicial 
error in finding that Brimhall was a 'joint ven-
turer' with appellant and as such was authorized 
to act as an agent for appellant in entering into 
the purchase order agreement for the sale of 
American Aggregate qnartzite." (Italics added). 
3 
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The statement itself impliedly acknowledges that 
the purchase order issued by Otto Buehner & Company 
to Brimhall personally with all sums payable personally 
to Brimhall, and nothing to plaintiff, was for aggre-
gate owned by plaintiff-appellant American Aggregate 
Corporation. 
On pages 14 to 19 of their brief, defendants-
respondents quote some irrelevant conjectural testi-
mony of Brimmhall, claiming that it "supports the 
trial court's finding of a joint venture." The "finding" 
was a conclusion unsupported by the evidence, and 
inconsistent with the judgment as modified. Defend-
ants argue that such testimony (although inconsistent 
with Brimhall's admissions) shows that there was some 
"agreement" prepared by counsel for plaintiff, but not 
signed, which would have allowed Brimhall $10 per 
ton for crushing services alone, pins "division of the 
profits" The officers of plaintiff* denied there ever was 
any such "agreement" oral or written, but only an oral 
agreement to pay Brimhall, the independent mining 
and crushing contractor a fixed fee of $10 per ton 
when the aggregate was sold and the money collected. 
Inasmuch as Brimhall testified that the going rate was 
only $7 per ton for those services the $10 per ton 
included not only a profit within the $7, but also an 
additional profit of $$3 per ton. Obviously, no lawyer 
representing plaintiff would have drawn any kind of 
"agreement" so one-sided in favor of Brimhall, to allow 
him to reap the normal profit within the going rate of 
$7 per ton, plus the $3 per ton extra profit, and then 
4 
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also a "division of the profits" without even permitting 
American Aggregate Corporation as the owner to 
recover all of its costs and expenses. Brimhall's own 
admissions on deposition and on cross-examination, re-
futed such fantastic unconscionable claims. 
"The rule is that the testimony of a witness is no 
stronger than where it is left on cross-examination." 
Oberg v. Sanders, 111 Utah 507, 518, 184 P . 2d 229. 
This applies not only to the admissions made by D. W. 
Brimhall, but also to those made by defendant Paul 
Buehner and other witnesses for defendants and for 
Brimhall. By self-serving declarations and hearsay, 
defendants attempted to make Brimhall an "agent" of 
plaintiff; but they want this Court to overlook the fact 
that defendants induced Brimmhall to sign acceptance 
of an outrageous purchase order (Exhibit 19-P) in 
the name of D. W. Brimhall personally for the sale 
of plaintiff's aggregate not only below plaintiff's costs 
at a figure dictated by defendants, but with all payments 
therefor solely to Brimhall, with nothing payable to 
plaintiff as owner. Brimhall was thereby acting ad-
versely to plaintiff as owner of the materials. 
The sworn admissions of Brimhall included: (a) 
As a licensed independent contractor, in 1967 Brimhall 
made an oral agreement with American Aggregate to 
move into plaintiff's quarry and mine and crush plain-
tiff's white quartz aggregate at his own convenience 
with his own equipment and employees at his own ex-
pense. (It. 209, 566-568, Ab. 27, 80). (b) H e said 
5 
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he was to receive $10 per ton when the material was 
sold. (R. 250, Ab. 33). That $10 included "whatever 
was necessary to get it into a finished product", includ-
ing removing overburden, mining, crushing, moving 
equipment, wear on equipment, etc. (R. 214-216. 
Ab. 28). (c) The $10 per ton included his anticipated 
profit (R. 605-606, Ab. 86-87), for that type of op-
eration was then generally contracted at the rate of $7 
per ton. (d) H e was to be paid the $10 per ton when 
American Aggregate sold the aggregate and collected 
the money. (R. 278-279, Ab. 36). (e) H e never was 
paid anything in excess of $10 per ton (even when the 
sale price was the regular price of $35 per ton). 
Defendants argue on page 12 that Don Reimann, 
(vice-president), prior to the time defendants issued 
the purchase order to Brimhall, Exhibit 19-P, told 
Buehner "to deal with Brimhall, work it out with Brim-
hall"; but Don Reimann testified that he told Buehner 
he could deal with Brimhall as to sizes, not as to prices. 
(R. 365-366, Ab. 48). No reasonable person could 
believe that when the Reimanns owned the aggregate 
which had been specified by the architects, and the 
samples from plaintiff's quarry had been approved by 
the architects, that plaintiff would consent to allow a 
competitor to dictate the price at which plaintiff would 
sell, or o delegate that function to the crushing con-
tractor. I t is undisputed that Paul Buehner asked plain-
tiff for quotations which recognized plaintiff's owner-
ship. Plaintiff quoted $29.50 per ton delivered, for 
selected sizes. 
6 
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Buehner admitted that he told Don Reimann that 
the quoted price was "too high." When Buehner repre-
sented that he could get the same material or similar 
material for $19.50 a ton from a man named Chidester, 
Don Reimann replied that "they couldn't get that 
material unless they stole it from us. I t was specified 
on the job." Buehner then threatened to siibstitute 
other material if he could not get the plaintiff's aggre-
gate at his own price, but Reimann said he had talked 
to the architect and that the architects would not allow 
any substitution. Plaintiff refused to lower the quo-
tation. (R. 335-339, Ab. 42-43). 
Paul Buehner used Brimhall to negotiate for him 
and to act as his tool or agent, as demonstrated by Paul 
Buehner's own admissions. Buehner testified (a) He 
asked Brifhall to talk to Don and Rich Reimann and 
see if they would lower the price. (R. 44-48, Ab. 6-7). 
(b) Buehner then told Brimhall he planned to take 
all sizes known as "crusher run." That representation 
was utterly false, as Buehner intended to take selected 
sizes. Buehner had Brimhall go back and forth to the 
officers of American Aggregate several times, (c) 
Buehner told Brimhall to tell Don Reimann that the 
price was too high, and that he had better lower the 
figure, (d) When Brimhall returned with a quotation 
from plaintiff of $25.50 for "crusher run", per ton, 
and stated it was the lowest price American Aggregate 
would take, Buehner said, "No deal" (R. 49-50, 140-
142, Ab. 7, 19). Although Buehner said he did not 
know what the agreement was between American Ag-
7 
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gregate and Brimhall, he told Brimhall that if Brimhall 
did not sign with him he was going to have a substitu-
tion and give a purchase order to Chidester. Buehner 
offered $5,000.00 "move-in-cost" to sign a purchase 
order for $20.50 a ton, and Brimhall signed Exhibit 19-
P soon afterwards, on October 17, 1969, with the under-
standing that the Buehners were going to take "crusher 
run". Exhibit 20-P stated that the purchase order was 
for "selected sizes," (not crusher run). (R. 222-225), 
608-610, 632, Ab. 30, 88, 92). Obviously, neither Brim-
hall nor defendants sent American Aggregate Corpor-
ation a copy of such putative purchase order. 
While defendants argue that plaintiff was bound 
by the acts of Brimhall, under a theory of a joint ven-
ture, the claim of joint venture contradicts the admis-
sions of Brimhall that he was to be paid a fixed fee of 
$10 per ton, and the judgment as modified specifies 
that plaintiff is not liable for any additional charges 
than the $7.25 per ton agreed on in the settlement made 
July 9, 1970, when the figure was scaled down from 
$10 per ton. If Brimhall acted as "agent" for any one, 
it was for the benefit of the defendants to unjustly 
enrich defendants to the financial loss and detriment 
of plaintiff. 
I I . 
T H E B U E H N E R D E F E N S E O F "RE-
L E A S E " W A S S P U R I O U S , S INCE P L A I N -
T I F F N E V E R E X E C U T E D A N Y R E L E A S E , 
A N D P A U L B U E H N E R S A D M I S S I O N S ON 
8 
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D E P O S I T I O N P L U S A D M I S S I O N S ON 
CROSS-EXAMINATION, P L U S D E F E N D -
A N T S ' OWN DOCUMENT, E X H I B I T 40-P, 
D I S C R E D I T E D B U E H N E R ' S T E S T I M O N Y 
B O T H AS TO " R A T I F I C A T I O N " O F A N Y 
$20.50 P E R TON P R I C E A N D " R E L E A S E " . 
On pages 22 to 24 Respondents argue that Appel-
lant "ratified" Exhibit 19-P (the purchase order issued 
by Otto Buehner & Company to D. W. Brimhall per-
sonally) as to $20.50 per ton for the aggregate. I t is 
claimed that on May 29, 1970, Paul Buehner had a 
telephone conversation with Don Reimann. Buehner 
said he "refreshed his recollection" by referring to a 
diary, for May 29 and June 3, 1970. He testified that 
Don Reimann said "we would accept the price on the 
aggregate which has been discussed", and he "would 
like to have us help him with the use of our models and 
molds on the oxen (for two temples) at the reduced 
price." Buehner tied the said "agreement" as to the 
"aggregate" price to the "agreement" for the molds of 
the oxen. Such testimony was offered in support of 
the challenged defense of a purported "release" by 
plaintiff American Aggregate Corporation to Otto 
Buehner & Company. 
Independent of the fact that a lot of self-serving 
entries are made in diaries, even by criminals, the de-
fense was sham, as illustrated on cross-examination. 
The transaction relating to the molds for oxen for the 
Ogden and Provo Temples, was not negotiated with 
plaintiff at all, but with Style-Crete, Inc., an entirely 
9 
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separate corporation from American Aggregate. Ex-
hibit P-40 dated March 18, 1971, was prepared by 
Otto Buehner & Company. I t makes no reference 
whatsoever to the aggregate owned by American Agg-
regate Corporation. Paul Buehner's direct examination 
was destroyed on cross-examination. 
On cross-examination Paul Buehner admitted that 
no purchase order ever was issued in the name of Ameri-
can Aggregate Corporation for any of the aggregate 
hauled away from plaintiff's leasehold in Box Elder 
County to the Otto Buehner & Company plant in Mur-
ray during 1969 and 1970. If there had been an "agree-
ment" with plaintiff to "ratify" a price of $20.50 per 
ton, (which was below plaintiff's costs), Otto Buehner 
& Company certainly would not have neglected to issue 
a purchase order and have plaintiff sign it. Exhibit 
40-P, instead of showing generosity on the part of Otto 
Buehner & Company to plaintiff it showed that Otto 
Buehner & Company was going to get the finished 
molds from Style-Crete, Inc., (not from American Ag-
gregate Corporation) which were worth thousands of 
dollars, according to the testimony. 
The pleaded defenses of "release" and "ratifica-
tion" were spurious. The proffered testimony in sup-
port thereof, was destroyed on cross-examination. 
Paul Buehner did not offer any testimony to con-
tradict the following testimony of Richard C. Reimann, 
president of plaintiff corporation: Buehner called Rei-
mann about a month after the meeting of May 1, 1970, 
and asked for a quotation several hundreds tons of 
10 
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aggregate for the B.Y.U. job, and Reimann quoted 
the regular price of $35 per ton. (R. 459-460, Ab. 63). 
About the same time, Marv Allred, plant superin-
tendent for Otto Buehner & Company, called Don R. 
Reimann for a quotation and also was quoted $35 per 
ton. That testimony was not rebutted. No purchase 
order was issued, but plaintiff subsequently discovered 
that its aggregate continued to be hauled away. Plain-
tiff was frustrated in its attempts to get any weigh 
tickets or accounting from either Otto Buehner & Com-
pany or its contract-carriers Clark Tank Lines and 
Christensen Feed & Seed. 
I I I . 
D E F E N D A N T S - R E S P O N D E N T S P O I N T 
TO N E I T H E R P R O O F NOR A D M I S S I O N S 
O F A N Y " R A T I F I C A T I O N " BY P L A I N T I F F -
A P P E L L A N T OF T H E B R I M H A L L PUR-
C H A S E ORDER, NOR TO A N Y P O S S I B L E 
" P R O O F " T H A T P L A I N T I F F M A D E A N Y 
" P R O F I T " I N T H E TRANSACTION. 
On page 24 it is argued that there was a "ratifica-
tion" of the Brimhall purchase order (Exhibit 19-P). 
However, respondents cite no evidence to support such 
contention. They make the unwarranted contention that 
counsel for appellant "argues" that "such ratification 
by his clients was illegal because it violated the Unfair 
Practices Act." That is a misquotation. There never 
was any admission of "ratification." Appellant con-
tended that even if there had been an attempted rati-
11 
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f ication, which there was not, it would have been against 
public policy and void under the Unfair Pratices Act, 
Sees. 13-5-3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 15 and 17, U.C.A. 1953, be-
cause the Brimhall sale of plaintiff's materials was 
below plaintiff's costs. Plaintiff also contended that it 
would have been illegal under the statute prohibiting 
price-fixing, restraint of trade and monopoly, Sees. 
50-1-1, 2, 3, 6 and 10, U.C.A. 1953. Buehner admitted 
that plaintiff was a competitor of Otto Buehner & 
Company in the aggregate business. 
There is no basis for the argument on pages 24 
and 25 of the Brief of Defendants-Respondents that 
plaintiff-appellant made any "profit" from either 
crushing or hauling. Plaintiff admittedly hauled only 
259 tons to defendant Buehner company plant, at the 
request of defendant corporation. As to the 4,000 tons 
of plaintiff's aggregate wrongfully sold under the 
Brimhall purchase order, Otto Buehner contracted the 
hauling thereof to Clark Tank Lines for $7.55 per ton, 
Exhibit 5-D. Plaintiff had nothing to do with Clark 
Tank Lines, and did not see such Exhibit 5-D until 
the time of trial. Plaintiff could not possibly have 
profited from that hauling which was under the control 
and management of Otto Buehner & Company and its 
contract carrier and subcontractor Christensen Feed & 
Seed. 
On pages 10 and 11 a small portion of the testi-
mony of Gaylen Christensen is quoted to the effect that 
Don Reimann did not tell that subcontractor of Clark 
Tank Lines not to deliver any more aggregate, but 
12 
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told the witness to continue hauling. Such quoted testi-
mony was not merely contradicted by Don Reimann, 
but even destroyed on cross-examination of Christensen 
and of his employee which showed that Don Reimann 
called to find out how much tonnage had been hauled 
from the quarry which had gone over the Christensen 
Feed & Seed scales; and that false information was 
given to Reimann as to the quantities. Clark Tank 
Lines had been told to stop hauling from plaintiff's 
quarry as early as February 1970. Both Clark Tank 
Lines as Buehner's contract carrier and Christensen as 
subcontractor, when they ultimately furnished informa-
tion, gave false and misleading information showing 
lesser amounts than actually hauled, as illustrated by 
Exhibits 7-P, 21-P and 28-P. Except for an under-
statement of tonnage on June 16, 1970, Exhibit 25-P, 
defendants gave plaintiff no information directly at 
all until shortly prior to filing suit in 1971. Defendants 
withheld weigh tickets and an accounting, which had 
been promised in the conference of May 1, 1970. De-
fendants hindered and delayed plaintiff and counsel in 
getting accurate information as to tonnage of plaintiff's 
materials hauled away, and some of that information 
was not obtained until the time of trial. 
Typical of misstatements of the evidence, on page 
2 of their brief respondents contradict the admissions 
made by Brimhall, by representing that Brimhall and 
plaintiff American Aggregate Corporation "had a 
joint interest in crushed white quartzite which had re-
mained substantially unsold for three or four years." 
13 
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Brimhall admitted that he had only a right to collect 
$10 per ton for mining and crushing under an oral 
agreement made in 1967. Only two years later, on Oc-
tober 17, 1969, he signed Exhibit 19-P at the request 
of Paul Buehner. There were sales of said aggregate 
in 1967 and 1968, including sales to Otto Buehner & 
Company at $35 per ton (Exhibit 4-P). Brimhall ad-
mitted receiving payments in 1967 and 1968, never in 
excess of $10 per ton. Defendants objected to Exhibits 
31-P and 51-P showing payment to Brimhall January 
31, 1968, and the trial court sustained objection on the 
ground that such exhibits did not relate to any issue in 
this case. After having such evidence excluded, re-
spondents resort to misleading generalities, such as the 
unfounded contention on page 30 that "there were ap-
proximately 5000 tons of crushed material which neither 
Appellant nor Brimhall had been able to sell for three 
or four years." 
Independent of such exaggeration and unfounded 
argument, Brimhall never attempted to make any sale 
until Paul Buehner induced him to sign purchase order 
19-P in his own name for the sale of plaintiff's ma-
terials. Apparently, the respondents want to create the 
impression that so much time had elapsed since a sale 
had been made, that Brimhall was justified in some 
manner in accepting $5,000 "move-in-cost" from Otto 
Buehner & Company as an inducement to sell in his 
own name with all proceeds payable to himself, plain-
tiff's aggregate not only below the lowest price plain-
tiff said he could sell without "going in the red", but 
14 
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below plaintiff's costs. Brimhall not only admitted he 
had no authority to sell, but in March 1970 when Paul 
Buehner asked him for a price on 700 additional tons 
for another job, Brimhall stated that he had exceeded 
his authority and that the Buehners had to deal with 
American Aggregate Corporation. (R. 233-234, Ab. 
31-32). 
By amended counterclaim defendants pretended 
that they had obtained too much aggregate. They sought 
to charge plaintiff with the fictitious claim for damages 
for defendants' own wrongful acts in inducing Brim-
hall to sign Exhibit 19-P. Although Otto Buehner & 
Company had contracted with Clark Tank Lines to 
haul plaintiff's materials out of plaintiff's quarry to 
complete the process of converting plaintiff's goods to 
the use and benefit and unjust enrichment of plaintiff's 
competitor Otto Buehner & Company, defendants at-
tempted to make plaintiff responsible therefor. Plain-
tiff had refused to sign or endorse said putative Brim-
hall purchase order when its officers saw it about May 
1, 1970, and had refused to ratify it. At the trial, de-
fendants contended in defiance of the Statute of Frauds 
and in violation of the Parol Evidence Rule that Ex-
hibit 19-P should be construed not only as a document 
binding on the plaintiff as the victim of fraud and ill-
egal price-fixing, to enable defendant Otto Buehner 
& Company to have aggregate at $20.50 per ton for 
the church office building job, but in addition that such 
document should be construed (or amended in effect) 
so that instead of relating exclusively to the church 
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office building project, referred to in Exhibit 19-P, it 
would extend to any an every other job to enable Otto 
Buehner & Company to take any quantity of plaintiff's 
aggregate at defendant's dictated below-cost-price of 
$20.50 per ton. 
Knowing that plaintiff refused to sign or endorse 
Exhibit 19-P, on page 25 of their brief respondents 
make the unwarranted argument that appellant 
"is trying to convince this court that a seller can 
enter into a contract below cost and after deliver-
ing the full amount of the product, repudiate its 
agreement and recover on the theory that its vio-
lation of the law excuses its performance." 
Plaintiff-appellant did not execute any contract 
with defendants Buehner, so plaintiff did not repudiate 
any "contract." Plaintiff quoted prices for its material 
as it had the legal right to do, and refused to lower its 
prices to a below-cost figure demanded by its competi-
tor. Defendants well-knew they had to obtain those 
materials from plaintiff's quarry to comply with the con-
tract Otto Buehner & Company had made with the gen-
eral contractor and with the Church as owner. Otto 
Buehner & Company was quoted the price of $29.50 
per ton for aggregate of selected sizes for a quantity of 
4,000 tons, and it had that figure in submitting its bid. 
Contrary to the argument of respondents, plaintiff 
corporation only delivered 259 tons (at the request of 
defendant's agents) out of a total of 5,172 tons. Except 
for the 259 tons delivered by plaintiff for various jobs, 
the defendant Otto Buehner & Company helped itself 
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to plaintiff's aggregate by contracting the hauling of 
4,000 tons to Clark Tank Lines, Exhibit 5-D. Plain-
tiff never repudiated any agreement because the Bueh-
ners refused to make an agreement with plaintiff. They 
were determined to circumvent the plaintiff by their 
price-fixing scheme by giving a purchase order to 
Brimhall, which he subsequently admitted he had no 
authority to sign. Defendants made Brimhall their 
agent and tool in a price-fixing scheme, to defraud 
plaintiff. When officers of Otto Buehner & Company 
asked plaintiff for quotations on other jobs and were 
given quotations of $35 per ton because of the size of 
the order did not warrant a lower quotation, the Bueh-
ners did not issue a purchase order to plaintiff. They 
knew they could not get plaintiff to sign a purchase 
order at their dictated below-cost prices, so Otto Bueh-
ner & Company continued to haul away plaintiff's ma-
terials behind the backs of plaintiff's officers. 
Respondents' argument that the Unfair Practices 
Act and the statute against price-fixing are "not ap-
plicable to a seller who repudiates his own contract", is 
not in point since plaintiff never made a contract with 
defendants. Over objections of counsel for plaintiff, 
overruled by the trial court, defendants were permitted 
to introduce all kinds of incompetent evidence which 
was objectionable both under the Statute of Frauds 
Sec. 25-5-4 (1), U.C.A. 1953, and under the Parol 
Evidence Rule. 
The trial court was led into prejudicial error of 
making in effect a contract between plaintiff and Otto 
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Buehner & Company to which plaintiff never assented, 
and to which plaintiff refused to assent because it im-
posed on plaintiff an obligation contrary to law to 
allow its competitor to take plaintiff's aggregate not 
only below plaintiff's quoted prices, but at defendants' 
dictated prices below plaintiff's costs to plaintiff's dam-
age and detriment and for the unjust enrichment of 
plaintiff. The trial court by implication allowed Otto 
Buehner & Company to have aggregate at defendants' 
dictated price of $20.50 per ton, not only for the church 
office building job, but for other jobs not even referred 
to in Exhibit 19-P. 
The respondents who were the beneficiaries of such 
illegal price-fixing and unfair trade practices now have 
the audacity to ask this Honorable Court to affirm 
such judgment in disregard of the plain interdiction of 
the statutes, and in disregard of the constitutional 
rights of plaintiff. 
The unconscionable attitude of defendants was 
manifested when Otto Buehner & Company in Decem-
ber 1969 refused to talk to plaintiff's officers, but told 
them to get in touch with Brimhall, apparently know-
ing he was leaving town. Then when no purchase order 
was issued to plaintiff and in February 1970 when 
plaintiff's officer asked the Buehner office manager 
when plaintiff was going to be paid for its aggregate 
taken by the Buehner company, plaintiff received the 
curt reply, "You are not going to be paid." Otto Bueh-
ner & Company wrote Exhibit 19-P so that all money 
would be paid solely to Brifhall. Brimhall collected all 
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the money in his own name until June 29, 1970. None 
of defendants' arguments can erase their unconscionable 
misconduct. 
IV. 
T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S D I S T R I C T COURT 
H A S NO J U D I C I A L P O W E R TO O V E R R U L E 
T H E D E C I S I O N S OF T H E S U P R E M E COURT 
OF U T A H , NOR TO I S S U E SOME I N T E R -
P R E T A T I O N O F A U T A H S T A T U T E B I N D -
I N G T H I S COURT. 
On pages 25 to 28 of their brief, respondents cite 
and quote from a memorandum decision on the liability 
phase of a case in the United States District Court. No 
judgment has been entered. There has merely been a 
determination of liability under Federal statutes affect-
ing interstate commerce. I t is immaterial whether the 
Utah statutes are inapplicable in a Federal court case 
involving price-fixing and monopoly or other unfair 
practices in interstate commerce. The case before this 
Court involves State statutes and intrastate commerce. 
With all due respect to the United States District 
Court ,it has no power to overrule the decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Utah relating to State statutes, nor 
to issue any interpretation of a Utah statute which 
would be binding on this Court. 
Respondents apparently confused the trial court 
in arguments which impugned directly or indirectly the 
constitutionality of the Unfair Practices Act and the 
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Utah statute against price-fixing combinations in re-
straint of trade. However, it appears that whatever 
claims respondents made in the lower court, they have 
abandoned such argument and are not now challenging 
the constitutionality of either set of statutes. Conse-
quently, there is no need to defend the constitutionality 
of either statute. Respondents are saying that those 
statutes are not applicable in this case and misstate the 
facts in an argument designed to make those statutes 
inapplicable. Respondents are indeed desperate for 
argument when they have to look for some memoran-
dum in a Federal case in which there is no judgment 
entered, in an attempt to tell this Court that it ought 
to follow the decision of the lower Federal court. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that respondents 
have not met any issue squarely, but have misstated the 
evidence and omitted reference to all of respondents' 
as well as Brimhall's admissions, and that plaintiff-
appellant should have the relief as requested in the 
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
P A U L E. R E I M A N N 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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